U D K/UD C: 1 Izvorni z n a n stv e n i r a d
O riginal sc ie n tific p a p e r
The n a tu ra listic epistem ology of in d iv id u al k n ow ledge sh o u ld follow th e p ro c e d u re u s u a l in th e ep istem o lo g y o f science: g e n e ra liz e fro m succesfu ll cognitive practices!
In th e case of n a tu ra listic epistem olo g y th e d a ta b a se -th e cogitive p rac tice s it is su p p o se d to g en e raliz e, a re p rac tice s b a s e d o n cognitive skil ls, like p e rc e p tu a l cognition, la n g u a g e a c q u isitio n a n d u se a n d in feren ce. This w ould th e n m a k e cognitive p sycholog y a g u id e fo r epistem ology
C ognitive skills
T raditional epistem ology h a s b een p rincipally co n cern ed wi th in fe re n tia l processes w hich lead th e th in k er fro m beliefs to beliefs. The th in k e r was pictu red as a responsible deliberator, capable of choosing his own m ethods a n d rules of inference, fu l ly aw are of available m ethods a n d consequences of usin g them . Several assum ptions w ere em bodied in this picture, eg. w hat Po llock calls »doxastic assum ption« -»that th e justifiability of beli efs is a function exclusively of w hat beliefs one holds« (Pollock, 1986, p.19 ), a n d th en a n im p o rtan t assum p tio n cocnerning p rim a cy of inference:
-A ccording to th e C a rte sia n theory, th e rig h t te c h n iq u e fo r a c q u irin g b eli efs is i n f e r e n c e . T he c o n c e rn e d b eliev e r o u g h t to a s se n t o nly to th o se b eliefs th a t h av e b e e n g e n e ra te d by v alid step s fro m se cu re p rem ises. A n a c tu a l b e lie f is ju stified ju st in case it issu es fro m su ch a n inference« (Papi n ea u , 1987, p.131).
Nowadays, the epistem ological horizons have b ro a d e n ed so m ew hat. First, the n o n -inferential ways of a cq u irin g beliefs have becom e p ro m in en t in discussion. Second, we a re w itnesseng a blossom ing of »non-doxastic« theories w hich explicitely p ro cla im those non-inf e ren tial ways subject to epistem ic evaluation. Third, th e re h as b een a tre n d to m ove aw ay fro m w hat the th in k e r d eliberately does to w hat kind of cognitive system he is. To quote P ap in eau again: N. MIŠČEVIĆ: EPISTEMOLOGY BY RFFZd, 28(5) (1988/89)
•A ccording to this (i.e.naturalised) theory, the rig h t te c h n iq u e fo r a c q u i rin g b elief is sim ply to be a reliable b e lie f fo rm e r, th a t is, to h av e b elief fo rm in g p ro cesses th a t g en e rally p ro d u ce tru e beliefs. C o n c ern ed b elie v ers sh o u ld try to e n s u re th a t all th e ir beliefs com e fro m b elief-fo rm in g p ro cesses th a t a re reliab le in this sense« (idem).
O ne w ay to m ake this shift from doing to bein g m ore explicit is to introduce the idea th a t the rig h t w ay fo r acq u irin g belief is th ro u g h displaying an d developing the cognitive skills one has. I w ould suggest to view »belief form ing processes« as p e rfo r m ances or m anifestations of u nderlaying com petence, which we m ay label »cognitive skill«.
O ne obvious consequence of the change of in terest just des cribed w ould be a change in typical exam ples one aduces to il lu strate w hat is m eant by knowing, o r justifiedly believing. The trad itio n al exam ples are of the kind »John know s th a t th e w heath e r is fine«, a n d it is usually supposed th a t Jo h n know s this beacause he h as deduced it either from his p ercep tu al im pression of w hat could have been seen thro u g h the window, o r fro m sources like new spapers.
However, if one w ants to b ro ad en the class of relevant exam ples in the direction of ap p eal to various cognitive skills, one is going to be a ttracted to exam ples m an ifestin g those skills. Pollock, fo r exam ple, com pares epistem ic norm s to rules tacitely guiding a cyclist o r a golfer (Pollock, 1986, p. 129). Let m e add a few more:
(L): Jo h n know s th a t »This is a table« is a n en g lish sen ten ce. (P): Jo h n sees (veridically) th a t th e re is a ta b le in fro n t o f him . T h erefo re (P') Jo h n (perceptually) know s th a t th e re is a ta b le in fro n t of him .
I w ould like to insist th a t L is a good exam ple of knowing. The know ledge of language h as ra re ly attra cted th e atten tio n of professional epistem ologists, which is peculiar, given th a t it is a perfect specim en of a complex, highely intricate an d relatively closed dom ain, to the investigation of which no effo rt h as been spared. It poses obvious difficulties fo r sta n d a rd kinds of episte mology. Just try to figure out how is John justified in his belief about the english sentence.
Perceptual know ledge is sim ilar to linguistic knowledge. W e have it, but it is not im m ediately obvious how we have arrived at it.
O f course, it is probable th a t th ere a re ways to extend sta n d a rd theories to cover these cases. Instead of exploring this m ore cautious strategy, I propose to take exam ples involving com plex cognitive skills as basic, an d to look a t consequences. I am aw are 
G eneralising fro m su ccesfu l practice
O nce we change the p re fe re d set of exam ples, som e d eeper changes m ight set in. C onsider exam ples like L. Jo h n 's know led ge about the gram m aticality of given sentences seem s relatively unproblem atic. But, w hen one asks the question »How does it co m e about th a t Jo h n knows th a t given sentences a re gram atical?« one confronts a m ajor proble. There is no way to an sw er the q u estion by relying on intuitions o r on th e definition of knowledge.
In o th e r words, in o u r p re fe re d exam ples, the processes of know ledge acquisition a re respectab le objects of respectable a n d com plex em pirical, experim ental study.
F urtherm ore, once you g et the story about, lan g u ag e acquisi tion even in its m ost ro u g h outlines, it is e x tre m e n ly difficult, to tell, just by inspecting the stru c tu re of the process, w h eth er the le a rn e r is »justified« in his beliefs. Things seem to go the o th er way around: we a re convinced th at Jo h n know s his m o th er to n gue. T h e r e f o r e , we conclude th a t w h atev er way the m other n a tu re h a s chosen fo r him to teach him his m o th er tongue, this w ay is p robably all right. To set it out m ore perspicuously:
1. J o h n know s th a t p. 2. O u r b est science tells u s th a t Jo h n h a s a c q u ire d his k n ow ledge th a t p by u sin g th e m e th o d M. 3. W h ich e v er m e th o d le ad e s to know ledg e is ra tio n a l, justified, etc. 4. T he m e th o d M is justified, ra tio n a l etc.
The initial steps a re quite com m on in psychology. W hen in v estigating an ability one sta rts by a ssu m in g th a t people o r a n i m als in g en eral a re succesfull in doing certain things, and then search es fo r explanation. K now ing in one of these things:
•An a n im a l's m o st co m m o n p la ce su c cesses in bo h av in g give w itness to the v a stn e ss a n d ac cu racy of its p erc ep tio n of its en v iro n m en t, (...) Such b e h a viors all illu s tra te th a t p erc eiv e rs know th e ir en v iro n m e n t well. It is this fa c t th a t th e o ries of p erception, ultim ately, sh o u ld explain. T he ro u tes ta ken to ex p la n a tio n m ay be d iffe re n t, b u t th e goal, we believe, is to a c c o u n t fo r th e fac t I h a t a n im a ls perceive th e ir s u r ro u n d s su fficien tly to g u id e d is c rim in a tin g ac tio n s (m oving a m o n g su rfa c e s w ith o u t collision, ca tc h in g prey, follow ing verbal instructions, a n d so on). A th eo ry of percieving, then, Is a theory of know ing th e en v iro n m en t-[M ichets& Carello, 1981. p.l ).
O ne can then im agine doing epistem ology by traveling as fa r as possible together with the scientist. This is in fact the ideal of the proposal I w ant to skech in this concluding p a rt of the p a per. I am not claim ing th a t this is the unique rig h t way, only th a t it is a prom ising way which has not been am o n g the m ost ex plored.
The usual way to bring science in is in applications of episte mology -one first defines know ledge and justification an d th en leaves it to science to determ ine w hether perception, reaso n in g etc. has the requisite characteristics. This is quite d ifferen t from the reasoning skeched above (1-5). W e s ta rt from the assum ption th a t there a re a re as in which som e h u m an s possess knowledge. W e follow science on the »routes ta k en to explanation« in o rd e r to get the idea about general m ethods, cognitive strategies and tricks th at the cognitive a p p a ra tu s uses to acq u ire knowledge. Now, the m ost general and m ost universal characteristics of th e se strategies have a good chance to tu rn out to be m arks of succesfull cognition. Then, we m ight use o u r know ledge of these characteristics in order to fo rm u late advice on how to solve cog n itiv e problem s and to establish c rite ria of justification.
Here, then, is the proposal: 1. step: Suppose th a t h u m an s usu ally know th a t p. Rely u p on your inform ed intuition, in o rd e r to pick good candidates fo r p. 2. step: Leave to science -cognitive psychology, sociology of know ledge etc. -to describe p a rtic u la r processes an d m ethods by w hich h u m a n s get to know th a t p. 3. step: G eneralize from the scientific resu lts fro m th e p re vious step! Or, to p u t it in one sentence, generalize fro m succesful cogn itive practices! (This is, by the way, w hat philosophers of science have been doing fo r some tim e scrutinizing the epistem ological fo u n d ations of science. As Salm on p u ts it: »But the aim of such investigations is not to question seriously the acceptability of the b u lk of contem porary science; ra th e r, it is to u n d e rsta n d th e log ical stru ctu re of science m ore o r less as it is« (Salmon, 1974, p.186.).
It is not m y aim in this p a p e r to defend th e proposal, just to fo rm u late it. So, let m e be m ore specific abou t each step.
The first step is w here intuition plugs in. However, not even h e re is it thought to be sovereign. R ather, one should rely u p o n it in th e critical way linguists rely u p o n intuitions of native speakers.Furtherm ore, the role of intuition is lim ited in two im p o rt a n t ways. O ne h as alread y been m entioned -it h a s only to yield judgem ents of w h e th er o r not a given piece of belief rep resen ts know ledge, a n d should not be allow ed to tin k e r w ith theories a n d explanations. The o th er is modal -intuition has to be ap p li ed to a ctu a l w orld, not to counterfac tu a l possibilities. W hat 1 have in m ind is the following: if you ask a naive person w heth e r he knows th a t the w h eath er is fine, you will get a m uch m ore reliable an sw er th an if you ask the sam e p erson w hether a fic tional cognizer in G ettier-type situations has know ledge or not, o r w hether the beliefs of this cognizers a re justified. 'There are several in te rre la te d reaso n s why com m onsense intuitions in m a tte rs co u n te rf actu al a re w avering, often confused and g en erally unreliable, som e having to do with sh e e r (and u n d e rsta n d able) lack o f practice, som e with m ore principled m atters like absence of stricly specified backgrou n d conditions a n d the like (Is th e brain-in-the-vat believing all the blendw ork served to him epistem ically responsible? Well, does he have any m eans to check the tru th o f his beliefs? W hat does responsibility consist in is such o u tlan d ish circum stances? A nd so on). K. W ilkes h as ori ti sized tho u g h t experim ents in o th e r contexts, a n d although I would not go as fa r a s she goes, J think h e r reasons fo r d istru st ing conclusions reached solely on the basis of thought experi m ents a re good ones (see h e r »Real People«). O u r proposal res tricts the appeal to intuition to those cases in which it is so to say a t hom e, in its n a tu ra l h abitata, an d w here one can tru st it most.
Let m e m en tio n a striking exam ple. The well know n debate betw een constructionists a n d th e ir ecologist opponents in the theory of perception centers around a fu n d am en tal issue: is p er ception essentially a process of construction in which h u m an percep tu al a p p a ra tu s form s hypotheses an d tests them in o rd er to sup p lem en t th e povery of stim ulus, o r is it essentially a pro cess of detecting inform ation alread y p resen t in th e stim ulus in put? First thing to note is th a t at p resen t nowbody knows fo r sure which an sw er is right. F ar from being a cq u ain ted with o u r cogni tive processes, w e need a lot of costly eq u ip m en t an d h ard work even to sta rt learn in g ab o u t them . Second, a m om ents reflexion shows th a t once we get the answ er, the epistem ologist should not be in d ifferen t to it. If ecolgists a re right h u m a n s are, at the basic level, g a th erers of inform ation alread y p re sen t in the anvironm ent a n d freely available, an d their p rim ary task is to get »attu-nedd« to w hat the environm ent affords. If the constructionist is rig h t h u m an s a re riddle-solvers, incipient scientists at the m ost basic level of cognition, a n d their p ro p e r ta sk is an ticip atin g an d constructing, th eo ry testing an d theory revision. Now, it seem s obvious at least to m e th a t one can n o t have the sam e set of no rm s to do w ork in both cases. Even very g en eral norm s will differ. (I am not saying they will contradict each other, only that m ost norm s valid in a hospitable su rro u n d in g and with respect to very rich and reliable stim uli will be simply pointles in m ore a u ste re situations if not m isleading, w hereas the strict norm s suitable fo r the constructionist fram ew ork will be too restrictive in hospitable surroundings).
The second step pressuposes th a t there a re in g en eral m any things which we know, b u t a re not sure how exactly we cam e to know them. This is in m ark ed co n trast with Lhe C artesian idea according to which o u r m ethods of belief form ation a re in g e n eral tra n sp a re n t to us. I dont think it needs m uch arguing, be sides pointing to w hat is already a com m onplace in the study of cognition -th at this study is indeed difficult.
The output of the second step m ay consist of item s v arying in generality and solidity. It m ay contain sw eeping g e n eralisa tions like »what anim al perceives a re th e acts o r behaviors th a t a re afforded or perm itted by an object, place or event« (M ichaels & Carello, 1981. p.17), o r m uch m ore specific hypotheses like »By relating form s to functions, the child ties a function to a form , and thus gives motivation fo r that form« (Bates & M acwhinney, 1987. p.177). Some of the hypotheses will be firm ly e n tran ch ed in science and com m and wide consensus, some will be less u n iv er sally accepted. So, they m ight be p u t to differen t use. The m ost g en eral ones a re closest to the philosopher's heart, a n d of m ost help in offering positive proposals ab o u t epistem ic norm s, w h er eas the more specific ones a re im p o rtan t if you w ant to refu te som e overhasty generalistation.
This brings us to the th ird step. There are tw o kind of things which can be done a t this junc ture.
On the one hand, the epistem ologist can use the resu lts from step two in o rd er to test existing epistem ological recommenda tions. If we accept th at those re c o m m e n d a tio n s have a conditional form -if you w ant to attain know ledge an d avoid ignorance do such-and-such -it is easy to see how this can be done. Let us take the sim plest kind of cases -epistem ological theories which aim for obligatory set of norm s. Such theories will enjoin the cogniser to stick to one an d only one kind of stategy (usually very broad) if be w ants to avoid ignorance and reach know ledge. Suppose, however that there a re alternative strategies, an d th a t we know th at hum ans som etim es obtain knowledge by using them instead. Then, the theory u n d e r exam ination needs to be revised. H ere is one exam ple: th ere a re influential theories -in spired by Popper -which claim th a t the only ratio n al ro u te to respectable epistem ic state is the m ethod of inten tio n ally subm iting one's theories to m ost severe tests, a n d accepting them only if they w ithstand a good n u m b er of those. However, th ere seem s to be a t least one field in which h u m a n s a re able to acquire know ledge w ithout being corrected (without »negative data«), nam ely lan g u ag e learning. If w hat linguists claim is true, here is a cou nterexam ple to a n in flu an tial epistem ological view (I do not claim th a t the counterexam ple is in an y way conclusive, but only w ant to show w hat kind of counterexam ples I have in mind).
O ne can accept this negative role of scientific results w ith out going fu rth er. But even a t this m odest level it can be clearly seen how the present, proposal differs from G oldm ans. In Goldm ans story, w hat is to count as justification is decided on con ceptual grounds. The science com es in post fa cto an d only tells us about p a rtic u la r m ethods w hether they a re in fact, reliable o r not (Dretske has com plained about this in his review of Goldm ann in »Journal of Philosophy«). The p re sen t p ro p o sal enjoins the epistem ologist to ask science about the n a tu re of processes which we deem know ledge-producing, an d thus to h elp us d irect ly shape o u r epistem ic norm s.
If one w ants to go fu rth e r th a n sim ply usin g d a ta fro m science as a kind of negative test, one can then positively g en eralize. from psychology (and sociology of knowledge). Here is one exam ple. C onsider the radical probabilist strateg y of n ev er fully accepting a statem ent, b u t letting o neself be guided by it if one h as a sufficiently high degree of belief in it, and not very high disutilities attach ed to its tu rn in g out to be false. C ontrast this with acceptance theories which say th a t it is rational to ac cept som e statem ents as tru e a t least fo r th e tim e being. Now, it seem s th a t in gain in g percep tu al know ledge a n d in acq u irin g language, h u m a n s take m any beliefs fo r g ran ted , w ithout a s signing to them degrees of probability betw een 0 and 1.0 hi radi cal probabilist views, these a re then sim ply irratio n al and unjus tified ways to proceed, w hereas in the views of acceptance th e o r ists this need not be so. Suppose it tu rn e d out (and it is likely that it will) th a t m ost of basic cognitive skills a re g e ared to a yes-no kind of reaction. Then, it would be rig h t to g en eralise from this an d to opt fo r acceptance theories as a b e tte r way of codifyng cognitive practices.
